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Notes
Wrongful Conception: When an Unplanned
Child Has a Birth Defect,
Who Should Pay the Cost?
Williams v. Van Biber'
I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful conception is a medical malpractice claim by parents that arises
from the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure.' Wrongful birth,
on the other hand, is a claim that a health care provider has breached a duty
subsequent to conception that results in the birth of an abnormal child
While Missouri recognizes wrongful conception as a valid cause of action,4
it has statutorily refused to allow a wrongful birth claim.'
Williams v. Van Biber was an action for wrongful conception, but it
involved an aspect of wrongful birth, a birth defect. The case addressed the
question of whether parents may recover extraordinary expenses when a
negligently performed sterilization procedure results in the birth of a child
with defects. This note examines how other jurisdictions have handled the
issue, evaluates the Williams court's approach, and discusses the policy
concerns that surround such a claim.

1. 886 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). See infra notes

23-27.
3. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983).
4. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 188.
5. The statute states that,
No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages on
behalf of himself or herself based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct
of another, he or she would have been aborted. No person shall maintain a cause
of action or receive an award of damages based on the claim that but for the
negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.130 (1986); see also Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo.
1988) (en banc).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Gerald and Tammy Williams filed suit against Jeffrey Van Biber, M.D.,
for an alleged failed sterilization procedure.6 Mrs. Williams had experienced
several medical problems during a previous pregnancy, including gestational
diabetes.' Mr. Williams chose to have the sterilization procedure because an
obstetrician had cautioned that an additional pregnancy could be dangerous to
Mrs. Williams and the baby.8 On August 25, 1989, Van Biber performed a
vasectomy on Mr. Williams.' Subsequent to the sterilization procedure, Mrs.
Williams became pregnant.'0 She gave birth to Cody Williams on January
21, 1991." Although Cody appeared normal at birth, he was diagnosed with
severe heart deformities one month later.'" Various surgical attempts were
made to correct Cody's defects, yet he died approximately seven months
following birth.'" The Williamses were left with medical expenses that
exceeded $211,000.'4
The Williamses sought to recover their medical expenses, lost income,
and damages for emotional distress that resulted from Cody's birth defects.' 5
The Williamses asserted that damages associated with Cody's birth defects
were recoverable because they were the foreseeable result of the failed
sterilization procedure.' 6 Van Biber, however, took the position that
damages associated with the birth defect were not actionable in Missouri."
Van Biber filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, a motion for partial
summary judgment for all damages attributed to Cody's defects.' 8 The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Williamses appealed to the
Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals. 9

6. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 11.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Mrs. Williams learned that she was pregnant in May of 1990. Id. The
following month, Van Biber examined Mr. Williams' semen and identified viable
sperm. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 11-12.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/10
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.2" The appellate court
found that damages associated with correcting the birth defect did not fall in
the category of recoverable postnatal medical expenses. 2 The court held that
a negligent vasectomy is not the proximate cause of damages resulting from
a child's birth defect, and thus, a physician is not liable for costs resulting
from such defect.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Development of the Tort of Wrongful Conception
Wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy is a "claim by parents for
damages arising from the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure
or abortion, and the subsequent birth of a child."'
Courts tend to use the
terms "wrongful conception" and "wrongful pregnancy" interchangeably.24
The majority of wrongful conception cases involve the unplanned birth
of a healthy child.' When a deformed child is born, parents generally bring

20. Id.at 11 and 14. The case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court,
and on November 28, 1994, the Missouri Court of Appeals' opinion was readopted.
21. Id.at 13.
22. Id.at 14.
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990); see also University of Ariz.
Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1296-97 n.1 (Ariz. 1983)
(wrongful pregnancy is "an action brought by the parents of a healthy, but unplanned,
child"); cf Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (siblings did
not have wrongful conception action against doctor who negligently performed
sterilization procedure on their mother).
The negligent act involved is frequently a sterilization procedure such as a
vasectomy or tubal ligation. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Ark. 1982);
Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 474-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Flowers v. District
of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822,
822-23 (Fla. 1984); Miller v. DuHart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
However, the pregnancy can also result from a negligently performed abortion or
incorrectly filled contraceptive prescription. See Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520,
521 (Iowa 1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Mich. 1971); C.S. v.
Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 302 (Va.
1986).
24. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E. 2d 691, 695 (Ill.
1987); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984);
Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 673 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
25. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d
1294, 1296 n.1 (Ariz. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy action "is distinguished from
'wrongful birth' claim brought by parents of a child bom with birth defects"); Lininger
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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an action for wrongful birth. 6 However, when a child with birth defects
results from a failed sterilization procedure, this action has been deemed to be
a wrongful conception claim.2
The number of wrongful conception cases has increased dramatically in
recent years.28 Some attribute the growth of these cases to the increased
number of sterilization procedures that are performed. 9 However, this surge
may actually originate with the United States Supreme Court decision of Roe
v. Wade,3" which partially legalized abortion."' Before this decision, the
right to control reproduction through abortion was "generally illegal and3 the
2
courts were uneasy about encouraging sterilization and family planning.
Today, the majority of jurisdictions recognize wrongful conception as a
cause of action and permit some form of recovery.3 This acceptance can be
attributed to the resemblance between wrongful conception actions and
traditional medical malpractice cases.3"
However, an unsettled and
controversial area of wrongful conception involves the determination of

v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Colo. 1988).
26. 62A AM. JUR. 2D PrenatalInjuries § 92 (1990).

In a wrongful birth action, a health care provider breaches his or her duty to
disclose information or perform medical procedures with due care. Parents allege that
such breach deprived them of the opportunity to make a decision about the abortion
or conception of a fetus. The result is the birth of an abnormal child. See Lininger
v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Colo. 1988); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d
872, 875 (W. Va. 1985); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash.
1983).
27. See Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (failed sterilization
procedure that resulted in birth of abnormal child was labeled wrongful pregnancy

action); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1988)
(unsuccessful bilateral tubal ligation that resulted in birth of albino child labeled
wrongful conception action).
28. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 55, at 370 (5th ed. 1984).
29. A. Lynne Wiggins, Marciniakv.Lundborg: Physiciansas SurrogateParents?
Rolling the Dice for Recovery in Wrongful Conception Cases, 16 AM. J.TRIAL
ADVOC. 839, 839 (1993).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Elizabeth F. Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts,
Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for
a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 693 (1983/1984).
32. Id.at 691.
33. KEETON, supra note 28, at 372.
34. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1981) ("action for injuries suffered
as a result of negligently performed vasectomy and abortion procedures [is] merely an
extension of existing principles of tort law to new facts").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/10
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damages. 35 Although there is wide diversity among jurisdictions, essentially
four different rules exist: (1) limited damages rule, (2) benefits rule, (3) full
recovery, and (4) no recovery.
The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the limited damages rule.36
This permits recovery for ordinary medical expenses directly associated with
3
37
A minority of states follow the benefits rule, 1
pregnancy and childbirth.
which allows recovery for child-rearing costs minus the beneficial value of the

35. In 1967, a California Court of Appeals was the first to recognize that damages
in a wrongful conception case might be "more than nominal." Custodio v. Bauer, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
36. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 720 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568, 569 (Ark. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1975)
(overruled on other grounds but apparently still valid authority); Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. 1984); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822,
822-23 (Fla. 1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1084-86 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fulton-De Kalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654
(Ga. 1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ill. 1983); Garrison v.
Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 7-8 (Ind. App. 1985); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522
(Iowa 1984); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Ctr., 699 P.2d 459,462-63 (Kan. 1985); Schork
v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983); Pitre v. Opelousas General Hosp., 530
So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986);
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (N.H. 1982); P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d 556,
559 (N.J. App. 1981); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1985);
Jackson v. Bumgardner, 347 S.E.2d 743, 749 (N.C. 1986); Johnson v. University
Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989); Morris v. Sanchez, 746
P.2d 184, 188 (Okla. 1987); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 453 A.2d 974,976
(Pa. 1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751 (Tenn. 1987); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 516 (Utah
1988); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 306 (Va. 1986); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687
P.2d 850, 856 (Wash. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 878 (W. Va. 1985);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
37. These damages typically include the cost of the first sterilization procedure,
of a future sterilization procedure, prenatal and postnatal expenses, and mother's
medical expenses. See cases cited supra note 36; see also 70 C.J.S. Physiciansand
Surgeons § 128 (1987). Some jurisdictions allow recovery for physical and mental
pain, Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Minn. 1977), loss of
consortium, Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), and loss of
wages, James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1985).
38. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977) states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff.., and
in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages
[to the extent it is equitable].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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child.39 Jurisdictions such as New Mexico" and Wisconsin4 have allowed
full recovery of expenses for rearing a child, whereas Nevada has refused to
even recognize wrongful conception as a cause of action.42
Many early cases refused to recognize wrongful conception because life
was positive and the benefit of having a child negated any damage.43 Today,
although most courts recognize wrongful conception, this same reasoning
frequently bars recovery of child-rearing costs. Specifically, some courts hold
that a parent cannot be damaged by the birth of a healthy child,44 which is
a desired goal in many religious and philosophical beliefs.45 In addition, the
Arkansas Supreme Court expanded this argument by stating if a child learns
he or she was unwanted, the child could be harmed and society's desire for
healthy family relationships would be undermined.46

B. Recovery of ExtraordinaryExpenses
Whereas courts normally hold that ordinary child-rearing costs are not
recoverable,47 it is generally recognized that parents may recover

39. University of Arizona Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294,
1299 (Ariz. 1983); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 185 Cal.Rptr. 76, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885-86 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d
429, 436-37 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990).
40. Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991).
41. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Wis. 1990).
42. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986) (although action
referred to as wrongful birth, case involved a failed sterilization procedure). The
Nevada court distinguished wrongful conception from medical malpractice and stated
whereas medical malpractice results in death or disability, the birth of a healthy child
does not cause damage. Id. at 1078.
43. See KEETON, supranote 28, at 372; Christensen v. Thomby, 255 N.W. 620,
622 (Minn. 1934); Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986).
44. See Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986); Jackson v.
Bumgardner, 321 S.E.2d 541, 545 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 347 S.E.2d 743 (N.C. 1986).
45. See Rivera v. State, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (N.Y. 1978).
46. Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982).
47. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr,
628 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Ark. 1982); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla.
1984); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1984);
Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (I11.1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346
N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1984); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 467 (Kan.
1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Minn. 1977); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006
(N.H. 1982); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/10
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extraordinary expenses necessary to "treat the birth defect and any additional
medical or educational costs attributable to the birth defect., 48 Some courts
denying child-rearing costs for a healthy child have indicated that "differing
circumstances, including but not limited to the birth of an abnormal or injured
child, might lead us to a different conclusion."49
In Fassoulas v. Ramey, a failed sterilization procedure resulted in the
One was healthy and the other had congenital
birth of two children."
deformities. The court held that child-rearing expenses were not recoverable
for the healthy child. However, recovery for extraordinary costs associated
with a defective child constituted a viable claim." This holding was based
on the rationale that "[s]pecial medical and education expenses ...are often
staggering and quite debilitating to a family's financial and social health."52

McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 852 (Wash. 1984); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650
P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
48. James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985) (wrongful
pregnancy); see alsoTurpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (wrongful birth);

Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984) (wrongful conception, although
court labeled action wrongful birth); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984)
(wrongful birth); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 841 (N.J. 1981) (wrongful birth);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978) (wrongful birth, although court
labeled action wrongful life); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975)
(wrongful birth); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982) (wrongful birth);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 493 (Wash. 1983) (wrongful birth and
wrongful life); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975)
(wrongful birth and wrongful life).
49. Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (N.H. 1982) (wrongful conception);
see also Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982) (Wrongful conception

case where the court said decision to deny child-rearing expenses for healthy child
"should not be construed as addressing [damages] when the child isborn and afflicted
with predetermined or readily foreseeable genetic or hereditary defects."); Flanagan v.
Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (Wrongful birth action where
court denied child-rearing expenses for healthy child but stated where child is
unhealthy, the logical result is "parents would be entitled to recover the extra costs of
raising the child over and above the ordinary child-rearing expenses.").
In Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981), a negligently performed
vasectomy, wrongful conception, and negligently performed abortion, wrongful birth,
resulted in birth of child. Id. at 113. The court held where a physician negligently
performed a vasectomy and a genetically defective child resulted, the expense of
raising the child was recoverable. Id. at 113-14.
50. 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (action labeled wrongful birth, but birth of
defective child resulted from negligent performance of sterilization procedure, which
is wrongful conception).
51. Id. at 823.
52. Id at 824.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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In some cases where a child is born with a birth defect, courts have
allowed recovery for support and maintenance costs beyond the age of
majority." This holding is typically based on the fact that where a child is
incapable of supporting himself or herself because of a disability, parents are
obligated to provide support post-majority.54
Because wrongful conception is rarely applicable to a case where the
child is born with a birth defect, the area of wrongful birth must be examined
The
in order to fully explore the recoverability of extraordinary costs.
rationale for allowing extraordinary costs yet denying ordinary child-rearing
costs has been addressed in several wrongful birth cases. As noted by one
court, "divid[ing] a plaintiffs pecuniary losses into two categories, ordinary
costs and extraordinary costs, and treat[ing] [only] the latter category as
compensable . . . seems [at first glance] difficult to justify."5 6 However,
limiting recovery to extraordinary expenses is "neither illogical nor
unprecedented."57 Three basic explanations justify the disparity. First, in a
wrongful birth context, this special rule applies the expectancy rule of
damages in a breach of contract case.58 Basically, plaintiffs in a wrongful
birth case planned to have a child, yet defendant's negligence interfered with
their expectations.59 The extraordinary costs rule puts plaintiffs in the
position they expected to be prior to the negligent act.6"
A second justification is that by limiting recovery to extraordinary
damages, plaintiffs receive damages proportionate to defendant's wrongful act.
Thus, plaintiffs do not receive a windfall. 6 Parents of healthy children

53. See Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1992) (wrongful birth); Blake
v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984) (wrongful birth); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d
341, 350 (N.H. 1986) (wrongful birth); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W.
Va. 1985) (wrongful pregnancy); f Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948
(N.Y. 1987) (wrongful birth-parents' obligation of support terminates when child
reaches majority).
54. See Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984) (wrongful birth); James
G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985) (wrongful pregnancy); see also
Lieberman v. Lieberman, 517 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (duty to provide
post-majority support arises from condition of child seeking benefit).
55. Most cases discussing extraordinary expenses are wrongful birth actions.
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 875 (W. Va. 1985).

56. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 349 (N.H. 1986) (wrongful birth).
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.(citing Patrick J. Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth andJustice in Tort
Law, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 954 (1979)).
61. See Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 886 (D.C. 1987) (wrongful birth);
Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 841 (N.J. 1981) (wrongful birth).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/10
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derive pleasure from children, yet a parent of an abnormal child "receive[s]
no compensating pleasure from incurring extraordinary medical expenses."' 2
Finally, many courts have noted that awarding extraordinary costs avoids
the speculative nature of damages that is associated with a healthy child. 3
In Kush v. Lloyd, the court stated that extraordinary expenses are "quantifiable
with reasonable certainty."'6
On the other hand, some jurisdictions have refused recovery of
extraordinary damages. For instance, in LaPoint v. Shirley the court found
where an attending physician does not increase the probability that a child will
be born with a defect, expenses related to the defect are not recoverable."5
In Azzolino v. Dingfelder the court stated wrongful birth cases fail to
recognize that the 'injury' for which [plaintiffs] seek compensation is the
"existence of a human life."67
C. Wrongful Conception in Missouri
In 1982, wrongful conception was first recognized as a cause of action
in Missouri. 8 In Miller v. Duhart, Mrs. Miller underwent a sterilization
procedure, yet she subsequently gave birth to a child. 69 The Eastern District
of the Missouri Court of Appeals noted wrongful conception is not a novel
cause of action, but rather, it is a form of malpractice' that gives rise to
"compensatorydamages that are measurable."7' Such recoverable damages
could include prenatal and postnatal medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss
of consortium, and the cost of a second sterilization procedure.72

62. Haymon, 535 A.2d at 886 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 842
(N.J. 1981)).
63. Id.; see also James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 878 (W. Va. 1985).
64. 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1992) (wrongful birth).

65. 409 F. Supp. 118, 120-21 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (action labeled wrongful birth
but child resulted from unsuccessful tubal ligation, which is wrongful conception
action).
66. 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985) (wrongful birth and wrongful life). A child was
born with Down's Syndrome when a doctor, nurse and health care facility negligently
failed to advise parents of the availability of amniocentesis and genetic counseling.
Id. at 530. The court refused to recognize the tort of wrongful birth, and consequently,
extraordinary expenses were not awarded. Id. at 537.
67. Id. at 534.
68. Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id. at 188.
71. Id. (emphasis added).

72. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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In Wilson v. Kuenzi, plaintiffs asserted wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions rather than wrongful conception.73 Although the court expressly
refused to recognize these claimed torts, the Missouri Supreme Court
discussed the unsettled area of recoverable damages.74 The Wilson court
cited with approval Judge Wachler's opinion in the New York case of Becker
v. Schwartz. 75 Judge Wachler stated that holding a physician liable for a
genetic defect essentially disregards fundamental legal principles. 76
Furthermore, requiring a doctor to pay for a genetically defective child creates
a "medical paternity suit."77 Although the court did not give a definitive
answer regarding recoverable damages, it suggested that recovery for damages
associated with a birth defect would not occur without solid proof of
causation.78
In Girdley v. Coats,79 the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the types
of recoverable damages set forth by the court in Miller.80 In Girdley, Mrs.
Girdley had a bilateral tubal ligation, yet she later became pregnant and gave
birth to a child."' The court defined wrongful conception as "a medical

73. 751 S.W.2d 741, 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
A wrongful life action is brought by or on behalf of a child who claims that
"were it not for the negligence of the defendant, he or she would not have been born."
Id. at 743. See supranote 26 for discussion of wrongful birth. See also infra note 82.
In Wilson, the child was born with a genetic disorder, Down's syndrome. The
parents brought suit on their own behalf and on the child's behalf against the physician
for not performing an amniocentesis during pregnancy or advising them of the
availability of such test. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 741-42.
74. Id. at 744; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (Supp. 1996) (effective 1986)
(no person shall maintain cause of action or receive damages based on claim that but
for negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted).
In Shelton v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 781 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1989), a parent
brought a malpractice action for failure to read an ultrasound correctly and advise that
fetus was developing with abnormalities. The Missouri statute, supra, precluded
wrongful birth claim. However, neither Wilson nor the statute barred a claim for
damages that resulted after the birth and "as a result of the shock of not being
adequately informed and prepared for the birth of the deformed child." Id. at 50.
75. 386 N.E.2d 807, 816-19 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachler, J., concurring and dissenting).
76. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 744 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816
(N.Y. 1978)).
77. Id. at 745.
78. Id.
79. 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
80. Id. at 298. See supratext accompanying note 70.
81. Id. at 295-96.
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malpractice action brought by the parents of a child born after a physician
negligently performed a sterilization procedure."82
The Girdley court accepted wrongful conception as a cause of action, and
it confronted the issue of whether a plaintiff may recover "the expenses of
raising and educating" a healthy child." The court noted most states have
adopted the limited damages rule, which bars recovery of ordinary childrearing expenses. 4 In addition, the court discussed policy concerns
supporting adoption of the limited damages rule."
The court was
particularly persuaded by the Kansas Supreme Court, which held the birth of
a healthy child cannot constitute a legal harm, even if such child is the result
of a negligent sterilization. 6
The Girdley court cited Wilbur v. Kerr, which stands for the proposition
that granting ordinary child-rearing damages would intrude the family unit and
make the child feel like an unwanted "emotional bastard., 8 7 Finally, the
Girdleycourt reasoned that respect for life is the center of civilization and that
neither human life nor parenthood are compensable losses.88 The discussion
ended with a statement that general tort principles oppose the full recovery
rule. 9
Many policy concerns caused the Girdley court to find that recoverable
damages in a wrongful conception case do not include ordinary child-rearing
expenses."
Although the recoverable damages listed in Miller were
affirmed, the Girdley court added plaintiffs may recover damages due to
emotional distress, loss of wages, pain and suffering from the second
sterilization procedure and any permanent impairment suffered by the
parents.9'
Two judges dissented from the court's holding that child-rearing costs
resulting from a physician's negligence should not be recoverable.92 The
dissenting opinion stated this case should not be about "the right to life, the

82. Id. Wrongful birth is a claim initiated by parents when a defective child is
born, and wrongful life is a claim filed by a child who suffers from birth defects. Id.
at 296.
83. Id. at 296.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 297.
86. Id. (quoting Byrd v. Wesley Medical Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985)).
87. Id. (quoting Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982)).
88. Id. (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983)).
89. Id. at 298.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 74.
92. Id. at 299 (Tumage, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Rendlen concurred
in the opinion of Special Judge Turnage.
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right to an abortion, the value of human life, or the value of the family as an
integral unit of our society."93 Rather, this medical malpractice case is
regarding whether an exception will be "carved out to exonerate physicians"
who negligently perform sterilization procedures.94
Girdley established guidelines for determining damages in a wrongful
conception case involving a healthy child.95 By refusing to allow recovery
of normal child-rearing costs, the court implicitly left open the issue of
recoverability of special damages in a wrongful conception case. Thus,
Girdley set the stage for the later case of Williams v. Van Biber.96
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Williams v. Van Biber, the Missouri Court of Appeals began its
analysis by summarizing the brief history of the tort of wrongful
conception.97 The court said a wrongful conception cause of action was first
98 which was later affirmed by
recognized by Missouri in Miller v. Duhart,
the Supreme Court of Missouri in Girdley v. Coats.' The court noted that
Girdley refused to allow recovery for the expenses of raising a healthy
child."° The court then stated that recoverable damages, as set out by
Girdley and Miller, are as follows:
prenatal and postnatal medical expenses; the mother's pain and suffering
during pregnancy and delivery; loss of consortium; the cost of a second,
corrective sterilization procedure; emotional distress; loss of wages; pain
and suffering associated with the second corrective procedure; and any
permanent impairment . . . suffered by the parents0 as a result of the
pregnancy, delivery or second corrective procedure.' '
The court cited a dictionary definition that described "postnatal" as
"relat[ing] to an infant immediately after birth.""I°2 The court reasoned that
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id
96. 886 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
97. Id. at 12.
98. 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see supra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
99. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 12; Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo.
1992) (en banc). See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
100. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 12.
101. Id. at 12-13.
102. Id at 12 n.2 (quoting WEBSTER'S 3RD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 1773
(1971)).
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because procedures to repair the child's birth defect were performed after
Cody was discharged from the hospital, they did not constitute immediate
postnatal medical expenses. 3 Consequently, the court found that the
Williamses' expenses associated with Cody's defect were not recoverable." 4
According to the court, individual case facts and circumstances must determine
what time span the term "postnatal" encompasses.0
Although the court found that under Girdley an award of extraordinary
damages was precluded, the court went on to discuss whether Van Biber was
"liable for Cody's heart defect."'0 6 In order to make this determination, the
court reviewed the issue of causation.0 7
The court began by stating that Van Biber's alleged negligence did not
cause the birth defects."' As support for this assertion, the court quoted
Wilson v. Kuenzi,"'9 which stated where the disorder is genetic, it is not the
result of any injury negligently inflicted by the doctor."" The court also
noted the Wilson court criticized cases that have "closed their eyes to
traditional tort causation.""' The court said other jurisdictions have rejected
claims similar to the Williamses' because the defendant did not cause the
Two cases were cited by the court in which "lack of
abnormality."'
foreseeability was a major factor in the courts' decision to not find

causation.""'
The court stated that "'[b]ut for' the allegedly negligent vasectomy, Cody
would not have been born and not having been born he could not have had
congenital heart defects.""' 4 However, the court added that proximate cause
involves more than the "but for" causation test, which only excludes that
which is not causal in fact." 5 By incorporating the reasoning of Callahan
v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp.,"6 the court noted that some items that are

103. Id. at 13.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 744-45 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807,
816-19 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachler, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 13.
111. Id.
112. Id
113. Id. at 13-14 n.3.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id.
116. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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causal in fact are too far removed from the injury to be a basis for
liability." 7 Consequently, the court reasoned that "but for" causation is an
absolute minimum." 8 The court further said Missouri has not applied a
pure foreseeability test. '9 Rather, the court noted an injury must be the

reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant's act.' 2° The court
found as a matter of law a negligent vasectomy
is not a reasonable and
2
probable cause of a child's birth defect.1 '
The court reasoned because the negligent performance of the vasectomy
was an act too far removed from Cody's birth defect, such negligence did not
cause the damage." The court found Van Biber's negligent performance
of the sterilization procedure was not the proximate cause of Cody's medical
expenses associated with the birth defect."2
Consequently, the court
concluded that Van Biber was not liable for expenses resulting from Cody's
2
birth defect. 1
V. COMMENT
The case of Williams v. Van Biber was the first Missouri wrongful
conception case confronting the recoverability of extraordinary expenses for
a child's birth defect. The court's decision to bar the recovery of damages
associated with a birth defect followed the subtle trend of recent Missouri
cases. For instance, Girdley v. Coats2 denied recovery for ordinary childrearing expenses in a wrongful conception case. Furthermore, Wilson v.
Kuenzi' 26 criticized the benefit-offset rule'27 and refused to recognize a
wrongful birth tort.'2 8 In consideration of past Missouri decisions, the
precedent set by Williams is not surprising. However, in its opinion the court

117. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 14.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id."This is generally a 'look back' test but, to the extent it requires that the
injury be 'natural and probable' it probably includes a sprinkling of foreseeability."

Id.(quoting Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 865).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id.

125. 825 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
126. 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
127. Id.at 744 (offsetting the benefit of a child against tort damages forces a
parent to assert that the child is unwanted).
128. Id.at 746; see supra note 26 and text accompanying notes 73-78.
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of appeals used a formalistic approach, misconstrued the plaintiffs' theory, and
failed to uphold the traditional objectives of tort law.
In a 1945 case, Judge Learned Hand remarked that "it is one of the surest
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out
of a dictionary."' 29 Contrary to this guidance, the Williams court footnoted
a dictionary definition of the word "postnatal" and declared that medical
expenses to treat Cody's birth defect did not fall within such definition. 30
This formalistic approach disposed of the issue within one sentence,'
yet it left no clear guidance for future cases. The court arbitrarily determined
that because Cody had been "discharged from the hospital in an apparently
healthy condition" his medical expenses were not recoverable postnatal
damages.'
Inversely, does this imply that if the deformity had been
discovered before release that all costs would have been recoverable?
Allowing the same medical expenses to be recoverable in one instance yet not
the other goes against a basic sense of fairness. Essentially, there was no
argument that the defect developed after discharge from the hospital; rather,
the defect was merely discovered after such time. If a defect is not
"discovered" until after hospital release, the physician escapes financial
responsibility. The court noted that the time span encompassed by "postnatal"
should be limited to the facts of each case,' 33 yet this still suggests that
''postnatal" is a race against the clock.
This arbitrary and unjustified rule could have negative financial effects
for parents, hospitals, insurance companies and public assistance programs.
Essentially, Williams encourages parents of children born after a failed
sterilization procedure to demand that every available test be performed on a
newborn before hospital release. Such action ensures that any unforeseeable
medical expenses will be recoverable.
The second issue the court confronted was whether Van Biber was liable
for Cody's heart defects.' 34 In determining this matter, the court stated that
"Van Biber's alleged negligence did not cause the birth defects."'35
However, this statement and the court's entire analysis misconstrued the
Williamses' action. The Williamses never argued that Van Biber caused their

129. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2nd Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404

(1995).
130. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 13. See also Note, Looking it Up: Dictionariesand
Statutory Interpretation,107 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (1994) (court use of dictionary
definitions has increased although dictionaries are not perfect sources).
131. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 13.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id
135. Id.
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son's birth defect. Rather, plaintiffs contended that if the doctor had not
breached his duty to render proper medical treatment, the child would not
have been conceived or born. 3 6 Consequently, they would not have been
injured in the form of medical expenses, lost income and emotional
distress.' 37
By applying the court's analysis to the appropriate injury, the soundness
of the decision is called into question. Following the court's path, one must
first ask whether the Williamses' injuries were causal in fact. The traditional
test is the "'but for test': a defendant's negligence is a cause of an injury
where the injury would not have occurred but for defendant's negligent
conduct."'38 Thus, "'but for' the allegedly negligent vasectomy, Cody
would not have been born. ' "' The direct causation requirement is arguably
met. Assuming Van Biber was negligent, he directly caused or contributed to
cause Cody's birth, which resulted in the Williamses' medical expenses.
However, as the court notes, "'but for' is an absolute minimum for
causation." 4 '
Therefore, the second question is whether the injury was "a reasonable
and probable consequence of the act or omission of the defendant."'14 "This
is generally a 'look back' test but ... it probably includes a sprinkling of
foreseeability." 42 If the physician negligently performed the sterilization
operation, he breached his or her duty to the patient. The natural and
probable consequence of the defendant's omission is the birth of a child and
the parents incurring damages as a result of the medical and hospital costs
associated with the child's birth.
One may argue that extraordinary costs are simply "too far removed"
from a physician's negligence. However, assuming that the parents' injuries
resulted from the unplanned birth of a child, Callahan states that "it is
sufficient for liability if a reasonable defendant could foresee the person who
would be injured as opposed to the nature of the injury."' 43 Essentially, a

136. It is worth noting that neither Van Biber nor the Williamses made a
causation argument. This may be some indication that the court's initiation of this
argument was improper. See Brief for Appellants and Brief for Respondent.
137. Id; see also Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508-09 (Pa. Super. 1979),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 439 A.2d 110, 111-12 (Pa. 1981).
138. Heacox v. Robbins Educ. Tours, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
139. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 14.
140. Id. (quoting Callahan,863 S.W.2d at 862).
141. Id. (quoting Callahan,863 S.W.2d at 865).
142. Id. (quoting Callahan,863 S.W.2d at 865).
143. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 865.
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reasonable physician could foresee that by negligently performing a
vasectomy, the parents would be damaged. The form of such injury is
irrelevant. Delivery costs, prenatal medical expenses and extraordinary
expenses all result from the physician's negligence.
Even if the court insists that the nature of the injury be foreseeable, the
child's birth defect in Williams was foreseeable. The Williamses allege that
they informed Van Biber that they wanted a vasectomy due to problems with
"Mrs. Williams' previous two pregnancies and because her obstetrician told
them that future pregnancies would be high risk for her and the baby."'
According to a 1989 Missouri Supreme Court case, "[f]oreseeability is
established when a defendant is shown to have knowledge, actual or
constructive, that there is some probability of injury sufficiently serious that
an ordinary person would take precautions to avoid it."'45 Thus, because

One commentator suggests by focusing on the "product" of the negligence, the
birth of a child, courts fail to address the real injury. Jeff L. Milsteen, Comment,
Recovery of ChildrearingExpenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A MotivationalAnalysis,
32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1169 (1983). A more equitable result could be reached through
a motivational analysis. Id.at 1169-70. Courts should investigate parents' motivation
for avoiding childbirth. Id. Because the law is "'directed toward the compensation
of individuals ... for losses which they have suffered in respect of all their legally
recognized interests,' a determination of the specific interests the parent(s) sought to
protect ...would relate to the appropriateness of the damages to be awarded." Id.at
1170 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971)).
Courts have identified three different motives for why parents seek to have a
sterilization procedure performed: (1) therapeutic, to prevent harm to the mother,
Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983), (2) eugenic, to avoid the birth
of a defective child, Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 499 (Pa. Super. 1979), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part,439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981), and (3) socioeconomic, to avoid the
economic burden of rearing a child or the interference with lifestyle, Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977).
Courts should look at the interests a plaintiff sought to preserve and determine
if injury due to the physician's negligence resulted. Milsteen, supra, at 1197. For
instance, if an eugenically motivated sterilization procedure fails and a defective child
results, the parents' interest injured is the "financial and emotional 'expense' of raising
an impaired child." Id.at 1193. Parents should recover extraordinary child-rearing
expenses for "special medical costs necessitated by the child's impaired condition
....
"Milsteen, supra, at 1192-93.
See also Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. 1990) (if parents' desire to avoid
birth of child was based on eugenic or therapeutic reasons, justification for allowing
recovery of child-rearing costs was "less than when, to conserve family resources, the
parents sought unsuccessfully to avoid conceiving another child").
144. Williams, 886 S.W.2d at 14.
145. Pierce v. Platte-Clay Elec. Co-Op, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Mo. 1989)
(en banc). See also Brief for Appellants at 9.
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Van Biber knew Mrs. Williams or the baby was at risk, the happening of a
birth defect was foreseeable.
The court cites two cases supporting its argument that Van Biber did not
legally cause the abnormality. However, these cases can be distinguished from
Williams, and therefore, they lend no support to the court's holding. For
instance, Garrisonv. Foy4 6 involved a failed vasectomy that resulted in the
birth of an abnormal child. The Garrisoncourt noted that cases involving a
birth defect are, "by definition, within the wrongful birth characterization" and
therefore, there is a "paucity of case law dealing with recovery for a defect in
the wrongful pregnancy context."' 47 The court even stated that recovery of
extraordinary expenses has generally been allowed where a defect is likely to
appear in offspring, parents sought sterilization to avoid producing a child
with a defect, and yet an abnormal child is bom.148 However, in Garrison
there was no known defect that had a high probability of affecting future
children.'4 9
Likewise in LaPoint v. Shirley,' the other case cited by the Williams
court, there is no evidence that the parents sought sterilization to avoid bearing
a child with a birth defect or that the physician knew of such motive.'
This factor distinguishes both of these cases from Williams. The Williams
court, however, ignores that Van Biber was allegedly aware of the Williamses'
reason for seeking sterilization.
By inferring that the birth of a child is damaging, some courts have
misinterpreted this as implying that plaintiffs seek compensation for the
"existence of a human life."'5 2 However, it is "not the birth of the child that
is the harm 'but' the invasion of the parents' interest in the financial security
of their family-an invasion clearly foreseeable . . . by the doctor as the
probable consequence of his negligence in performing the procedure."'5 3
By refusing to award extraordinary damages, the court accomplished two
possible objectives. First, the court avoided the expansion of tort liability." 4

146. 486 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ind.Ct. App. 1985).
147. Id.
at 9.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
151. This case involved an unsuccessful sterilization procedure that resulted in the
birth of an abnormal child. Id.
at 119. The court stated that foreseeability is required
in medical malpractice cases and that "a physician can only be held liable if harmful
consequences could have been anticipated." 1d. at 121.
152. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 534.
153. Girdley,825 S.W.2d at300 (Tumage, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 609 (N.M. 1991)).
154. Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 749 (Billings, J., dissenting) ("enactment of so-called
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Second, the court supported Missouri's pro-life policy.'5 5 Both goals may
be valid, yet their merit is diminished when balanced against the public policy
concerns that were not addressed.
The court ignored and frustrated the traditional objectives of tort law:
compensation for harm, punishment and deterrence of wrongful behavior.'56
The parents in this case were faultless, yet Van Biber's negligence resulted in
harm to them. Where one party was negligent, the other should not have to
bear the burden. 7 Achieving fairness is the reason for liability when an
Denial of recovery deviates from the "generic
accident occurs. 5
proposition" that there is a remedy for every wrong.'59 Missouri has already
recognized that wrongful conception is a wrong."6 It has just declined to
provide full remedy to those who are injured.
The court elevated a traditional view of parental responsibility above
traditional tort theory. A traditional view of parental responsibility stems from
This view is demonstrated by states that have
society's interest in life.'
held one cannot be damaged by the birth of a child. 62 In fact, the court in
Cockrum v. Baumgartner stated that life's significance should not be
outweighed by the cost of supporting it and that life is at the heart of the legal
system.'63 Wrongful birth actions, rather than wrongful conception cases,
traditionally confront these obstacles. Additionally, as noted by Garrisonand
LaPoint, cases dealing with recovery for a child's birth defect are within the

'tort reform' legislation" should not control or influence the decision of the court).
155. See Jennifer Mee, Wrongful Conception: The Emergence of a FullRecovery
Rule, 70 WASH. U. L.Q 887, 912 (1992).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); Finegold,439 A.2d
at 114, 116; Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 300; Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H.

1986).
157. Shari S. Weinman, Birth Related Torts: Can They Fit the Malpractice

Mold?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 175, 191 (1991).
158. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS
41 (3rd ed. 1988) (quoting Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 537 (1972)).
159. Finegold,439 A.2d at 116. The court noted that an injury is a wrong, which
is a violation of one's right, and for every wrong there is a remedy. Id.
160. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 188.
161. Mee, supra note 155, at 911.
162. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986); Byrd v. Wesley
Medical Center, 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985).
1983). This case was cited by Girdley as a public
163. 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ill.
policy reason for denying full recovery in Missouri.
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purview of wrongful birth. However, an action for wrongful birth is not
allowed in Missouri.' 64
Even though Williams involved a failed sterilization procedure and was
therefore an action for wrongful conception, the Williamses sought damages
related to an aspect of wrongful birth-a birth defect. The court implicitly
reached the conclusion that benefits of parenting outweigh even extraordinary
costs. Consequently, although the tort of wrongful conception has been
allowed, 65 the court has severely limited recovery.
If the court was disturbed about contradicting Missouri policy or entering
the purview of wrongful birth, it merely should have expressed such concern.
By employing a formalistic approach and misapplying their causation analysis,
the court confused the issues at hand and left little room for precedential
effect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Williams court denied recoverability for extraordinary damages in 66a
wrongful conception case. However, this holding lacks strong foundation.
When the next case involving this issue arises, hopefully the court will
reconsider its position.
Many jurisdictions have decided this issue
differently,' 67 and by examining the reasoning in those cases, the court may
better understand the issue presented in Williams. Essentially, the question
should be "when a physician's negligence results in the birth of a child with
defects, may parents recover for measurable damages," and not whether a
physician caused the child's birth defects.
The court may continue to agree with the holding in Williams. However,
future decisions should be based on sound reasoning or policy judgments,
rather than a formalistic and unjustified rationale or mischaracterizedcausation
analysis.
MELISSA K. SMITH-GROFF

164. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Missouri has traditionally
been pro-life, which is illustrated by its statute codifying a pro-life policy. See Mee,
supra note 155, at 911. The Missouri statute states "life of each human being begins
at conception" and state laws "shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child.., all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to
other persons, citizens and residents of this state." Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (Supp.
1996) (effective 1986).
165. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 188.
166. See supra notes 131-153.
167. See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
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